https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g1GgnbN9oNw - Video of the testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary Hearings.

The husband of a woman who was shot three times in the attack (but survived) supports Apple:
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/...imes-in-attack/

Aaaand...
Rep. David Jolly (R-Fla.) introduces a pointless bill to blast Apple:
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/...pointless-bill/

I can think of two scenarios where this bill isn't pointless: Federal information doesn't deserve to be encrypted securely. Or only federal employees can become terrorists.

There are two situations here, which I think people are losing sight of.

The first is that of the private individual. When using your own phone, you should have the expectation of privacy.

The second is that of the employer. When you use their phone, you follow their rules. I know that every time I log into my work provided laptop the login screen says something to the effect of "This is company property, you should have no expectations of privacy when using it". Every time I get a new phone, I sign a form that basically says the same thing.

I have no problems at all with Apple not wanting to put private citizens' privacy at risk. That is how it should be. Keep my private stuff private.

I also have no problems at all with employers (such as the federal government) wanting to be able to see what their employees are doing with their equipment. They shouldn't be sending anything that needs to be encrypted (personally identifiable information, sensitive information) on a basic phone anyway, and at the very least need something similar to the SecuSUITE. They really should have a way to get into the phone, since they are the owners of it.

And they do. I believe (though I've not looked into it in any depth) that Apple's MDM provides everything that an employer needs in this regard. It's just that the federal government is probably no more competent than any other private enterprise in using it appropriately.

And if it doesn't provide that access, then that's a reasonable argument for not using Apple devices.

Jolly strange idea about who holds the power in that relationship. Which is the direr threat: that the Feds stop buying Apple gear, or that Pope Cook puts the Feds (or the whole of the US) under interdict and stops selling them Apple gear?

Peter

Threat to whom?

John Oliver on the Apple Vs. FBI issue:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zsjZ2r9Ygzw

The standoff between the FBI and Apple has indeed been brewing for quite some time. According to this article, IOS 8 was about where it started:

http://www.macrumors.com/2016/03/21/apple-fbi-encryption-ios-8/

Yep. iOS 8 was a big change in how aspects of encryption were handled on the phone. It closed off a number of tech support and other "back doors" of sorts that were being exploited by both unsavory criminals and law enforcement. It was also a jump in how they protected active data, instead of the past data at rest protections that have been around since the 3gs.

I'm aiming to circle back to that longer explanation of iPhone encryption changes likely this week or into the weekend. Which will also help to clarify Apple's choice of wording on that initial Q&A page.

iOS 9.3 betas also had hints of the iCloud backups being additionally protected using the PIN. Curious to see if that made it into the release today, or if that's being bumped to iOS 10.

Oh, I understand their wording. I just think it sucks for the layman and should be re-worded on what's supposed to be their plain-english "FAQ" page.

They're distinguishing between "Have we ever unlocked an iPhone" and "Have we ever extracted data from an iPhone". I understand the difference, but the general public (and any given politician) will not. To most people, those phrases either mean the same thing, or they think that unlocking has always been a prerequisite for data extraction.

I just think the paragraph would be helped by an explanation of the difference between those two things, and why in the past it's been possible to extract data without unlocking. And yes, that critical difference is at the heart of the fight. The fact that most people don't understand the difference is part of why it's so controversial.

Notice to vacate the planned March 22 hearing filed by the government lawyers:

http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2773536-Motion-To-Vacate-Hearing.html

"An outside party" has offered to crack the iPhone in question...

The new four inch iPhone SE includes all the security features of the bigger models. Looks like even the 'inexpensive' iPhone fleet will become more security capable, on average, going forward.

Wow. So, kicking the can down the road a little farther. Interesting.

I am not sure this is good or bad news. The fact that the FBI may not NEED Apple to produce a "broken" OS now, does not mean they won't need it in the future. This may be just postponing the issue.

If the case remains open which it currently is, Apple has a legal right to ask what method the FBI is using. Will be interesting to see if the case gets dropped by April 5th to possibly prevent Apple finding out what exploit was found.

For what it's worth, I suspect that the FBI and others on its side were totally unprepared for the public backlash, and this is a way for them to back down without losing face. It also keeps the issue live for "next time", whatever that means.

I suspect this is PRECISELY what is happening. That is what I was thinking when I posted right above, here. Unfortunatey, constant attempts by Governments to extend their reach is often articulated in small steps across decades. If you look at both EU and US history, it seems to me there's a pattern there. I'd be much happier if this was the time when a principle is established and, as much as reasonably possible, set in stone. The public opinion backlash would help A LOT in that regard, and I am not sure that will be there next time, when they try again.

Looks like it was successful. Official filing to vacate the initial order mentions the FBI has now accessed the data. http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/FBI_apple_20160328.pdf

People are guessing the flash ram was cloned, allowing a reset of the possible 10 tries counter. Important to note that the erase after 10 tries is not a default on setting. Looks like the contract from the FBI to a company for $15k was uncovered for whatever process was performed. http://www.macrumors.com/2016/03/23/fbi-israeli-firm-cellebrite-to-unlock-iphone/

Ah, the irony. Israeli hackers can crack it, so the FBI goes to them.

I hope the point here isn't lost on the FBI or on lawmakers: If it's important to our government that our computers and phones don't get hacked by foreign powers, then they need to actually let our companies build them that strong.

From public statements and whatnot, we know that the DoD / NSA types appreciate the importance of making phones hard to hack. It's just the FBI that's hard-headed about this, and they've managed to pull along a lot of their law enforcement colleagues.

No doubt, we're in a replay of the late 1990's crypto wars.

The truth behind how the FBI finally cracked the phone:

http://www.planteink.com/toons/2016/PlantB20160331.jpg

According to this article, the previous cartoon wasn't far off the mark: they used a 0-day security flaw sold to them by some low-profile hackers, not the Israeli firm as previously reported.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nat...26c5_story.html